Prosecuting individuals for the crimes of the group: whether the International Criminal Court should expand criminal liability to corporations and organisations by Wheeler, Caleb H.
Middlesex University Research Repository
An open access repository of
Middlesex University research
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk
Wheeler, Caleb H. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3076-2351 (2018) Prosecuting
individuals for the crimes of the group: whether the International Criminal Court should expand
criminal liability to corporations and organisations. In: Association of Human Rights Institutes
(AHRI) 2018 Annual Conference, 07-08 Sept 2018, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United
Kingdom. . [Conference or Workshop Item]
First submitted uncorrected version (with author’s formatting)
This version is available at: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/25408/
Copyright:
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically.
Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners
unless otherwise stated. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain
is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study
without prior permission and without charge.
Works, including theses and research projects, may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or
extensive quotations taken from them, or their content changed in any way, without first obtaining
permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). They may not be sold or exploited commercially in
any format or medium without the prior written permission of the copyright holder(s).
Full bibliographic details must be given when referring to, or quoting from full items including the
author’s name, the title of the work, publication details where relevant (place, publisher, date), pag-
ination, and for theses or dissertations the awarding institution, the degree type awarded, and the
date of the award.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the
Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:
eprints@mdx.ac.uk
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated.
See also repository copyright: re-use policy: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/policies.html#copy
	
	 1 
Prosecuting Individuals for the Crimes of the Group: Whether the International 
Criminal Court Should Expand Criminal Liability to Corporations and Organisations 
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The Burroughs 




 It was agreed during the Rome Conference that the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court would only allow individuals to be held criminally responsible for the 
crimes contained in the Statute. This decision has had the effect of excluding human 
rights abuses committed by corporations and non-government organisations from the 
jurisdiction of the court. Now, twenty years later, there is a renewed debate about 
whether corporations and non-governmental organisations should be exposed to 
prosecution by the International Criminal Court. The failure to include corporations 
and non-government organisations is seen as creating an enforcement gap that 
fundamentally undermines the Court’s oft-stated mission to end impunity. Crimes 
allegedly engaged in by Chiquita Brands International, Inc. in Colombia and United 
Nations’ peacekeepers in the Central African Republic are an example of possible 
criminal activity committed by organisations and act as a starting point for examining 
whether organisations should be held criminally accountable for their actions. The 
vital role that organisations play in the commission of atrocity crimes demonstrates 
that prosecuting the group, in addition to any individual members of the group, will 
help close the impunity gap at the International Criminal Court by creating increased 
accountability and enhancing the protection of human rights. Taking measures to 
close this impunity gap will allow the International Criminal Court to comply with the 
directive contained in the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
that ‘every organ of society’ act to promote respect for human rights so as to ‘secure 
their universal and effective recognition and observance’.1 
 Examples of organisational participation in atrocity crimes can be found in the 
context of both corporations and non-governmental organisations. In May 2017, three 
																																																								
1 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 




non-governmental organisations submitted an Article 15 Communication to the 
International Criminal Court (‘the Communication’) seeking the expansion of the 
Office of the Prosecutor’s ongoing preliminary investigation in Colombia to include 
corporate officials of Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (‘Chiquita’). 2  The 
Communication alleges that corporate officials employed by Chiquita made recurring 
payments to affiliates of the paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(‘AUC’), despite the fact that those officials were aware that the AUC was 
committing crimes against humanity.3 The payments were made as part of a corporate 
policy for the purpose of protecting Chiquita holdings in Colombia from harm 
threatened by the AUC if the payments were not made.4  Chiquita continued to make 
payments to the AUC even after it was declared a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’ by 
the government of the United States and despite the fact that Chiquita had been 
advised that it was acting illegally by continuing to pay the AUC.5 Chiquita only 
stopped making payments to the AUC several months before entirely divesting itself 
of its Colombian operations. 6  It is asserted that the money paid by Chiquita 
represented a significant contribution to the human rights abuses committed by the 
AUC.7 
 Corporations are not the only types of organisations that commit potential 
human rights violations. Allegations have been made against a number of different 
international organisations involving crimes that, if proven, could fall under the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. One example of this sort of 
organisational criminality is detailed in a 2015 independent report, which found that 
members of a United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic 
																																																								
2 The contribution of Chiquita corporate officials to crimes against humanity in 
Colombia: Article 15 Communication to the International Criminal Court, 
International Human Rights Clinic, Colectivo de Abogados José Restrepo, Fédération 
Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’homme (May 2017) § 1 (‘Chiquita 
Communication’). 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid at §§ 21, 23. 
5 United States of America v Chiquita Brands International, Inc (Factual Proffer) 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, No. 1:07-cr-00055-RCL-1 
(19 March 2007) §§ 29, 56, 62. 
6 Ibid at § 87; Cliff Peale, ‘Chiquita Sells Colombia Unit’, Cincinnati Enquirer (12 
June 2004) available online at <www.enquirer.com/editions/2004/06/12/biz_biz1 
achiq.html> (accessed 25 July 2018). 
7 Chiquita Communication (n 2) § 21. 
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sexually abused children in exchange for money and food.8  The report suggests that 
the behaviour of the peacekeepers could constitute crimes against humanity and war 
crimes under the Rome Statute.9 The report went on to conclude that the Human 
Rights Justice Section (‘HRJS’) of the UN Mission to the Central African Republic 
failed to properly report the abuse, to intervene to stop the abuse from continuing or 
to hold the perpetrators accountable for their actions. 10  These failures were 
contextualised as the latest in a series of similar problems experienced during other 
peacekeeping missions and were thought to represent ‘a culture of impunity’ and a 
‘bureaucratic culture in which many are not willing to take responsibility for 
addressing the violations’.11 While the departments of the United Nations implicated 
were not directly involved in the crimes committed by the peacekeepers, they could 
be seen as being complicit, both through the climate of impunity they fostered and 
their inaction in preventing future criminal activity. 
  The situations in Colombia and the Central African Republic are meant to 
highlight two ways in which different types of organisations might be liable for 
human atrocity crimes. However, despite the clear institutional involvement in crimes 
committed in both Colombia and Central African Republic, neither situation will 
result in the organisations involved being held accountable for their actions. Article 
25 of the International Criminal Court’s Statute limits criminal responsibility to 
natural persons, i.e. individuals, and does not permit corporations or other 
organisations to be charged with crimes falling under the Statute.12 The decision to 
exclude organisational liability from the Rome Statute echoes the finding of the 
																																																								
8 ‘Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Report of an 
Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping 
Forces in the Central African Republic’ (17 December 2015) at 17-21 <www.un.org/ 
News/dh/infocus/centafricrepub/Independent-Review-Report.pdf> (accessed 10 July 
2018). 
9 Ibid at 21, footnote 65. 
10 Ibid at 33. 
11 Ibid at 4. 
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court opened for signature 17 July 
1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) art 25; see also Norman Farrell, 
‘Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate Actors: Some Lessons from the 
International Tribunals’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 873, 874; 
Michael J Kelly, ‘Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide under International Law’ 
(2012) 6 Harvard Law & Policy Review 339, 346; Harmen van der Wilt, ‘Corporate 
Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes: Exploring the Possibilities’ (2013) 
12 Chinese Journal of International Law 43, 44. 
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International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that ‘[c]rimes against International Law 
are committed by men not abstract entities’.13 However, this oft-cited statement may 
be misleading to the extent that it suggests that the role of organisations is irrelevant 
or secondary to any discussion about international crimes.14   
 
The History of Organisational Criminal Liability at the International Criminal 
Court 
 
 There has been a debate about whether the International Criminal Court 
should be able to try organisations since efforts to create the court were revived in the 
early 1990s. A report prepared in 1993 by the International Law Commission’s 
Special Rapporteur for the ‘Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind’, was the first to address whether to include liability against organisations in 
the statute of the prospective International Criminal Court. The report unequivocally 
indicated that Working Group on a draft statute for an International Criminal Court 
‘agreed that the jurisdiction of the court would apply solely to individuals.’15 This 
position was reflected in the subsequent draft statutes prepared by the International 
Law Commission, both of which identified individual criminal responsibility without 
mentioning any form of organisational liability.  
 The discussion surrounding whether other forms of liability should be 
included in the Statute of the prospective International Criminal Court was first raised 
in the second annex of the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court. 16  A list of substantive issues that ‘could be 
discussed’ included the entry, ‘Criminal liability of corporations?’17 There was no 
further comment about the entry, although the decision to conclude it with a question 
mark suggests one of two things. A question existed as to whether the proposed court 
																																																								
13 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, vol 22 (1947) 465. 
14 William A Schabas, ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’ (2008) 
98(3) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 953, 953. 
15 International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
1993, Volume 2 part 2: Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the 
work of the forty-fifth session (United Nations 1995) § 64. 
16 Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Report 
of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 




should impose this sort of liability or whether it was worth discussing the idea at all. 
The answer would appear to be the former as the issue was raised again during the 
negotiations of the draft statute prepared by the Preparatory Committee in 1996. A 
summary of the discussion on organizational liability indicated that it had been 
discussed and the delegations had expressed a variety of views both for and against 
the idea.18  
 This diversity of opinions expressed in this discussion was reinforced in the 
draft statute produced by the Preparatory Committee. It contained two proposals 
addressing criminal responsibility. The first limited the jurisdiction of the court to 
‘natural persons’, although that limitation was without prejudice to the responsibility 
of states under international law.19 The second proposal permitted the court to ‘take 
cognizance of the criminal responsibility of: (a) Physical persons;’ and ‘(b) Juridical 
persons’. 20  The term ‘juridical persons’ is not defined although the proposal 
specifically excludes states from being considered juridical persons. Additionally, a 
note appended to the proposal indicated that some delegations had advocated for a 
definition that included organisations without a legal status.21 This suggests that, at a 
minimum, a ‘juridical person’ is any organisation with a legal status that is not a state. 
Unlike natural persons, the proposal limited the potential liability for juridical persons 
to ‘crimes committed on behalf of such juridical persons or by their agencies or 
representatives.22 The proposal does note that not all of the delegations supported the 
idea of holding juridical persons accountable. 23  This proposal survived in 
substantially the same form throughout the remainder of the negotiations leading up 
to the Rome Conference with the only minor difference being that the term ‘juridical 
persons’ was replaced with ‘legal persons’.24 
																																																								
18 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court: Vol 1 (United Nations 1996) § 194. 
19 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court: Vol 2 (United Nations 1996) §§ 80-1. 




24 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
‘Draft Statute of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court’ (14 April 1998) as reprinted in Official Records of the United Nations 
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 The conversation about whether to include organisational liability continued 
during the Rome Conference. As these discussions developed it became clear that the 
broad definition contained in the Preparatory Committee’s proposal would be 
narrowed to focus specifically on corporate criminal liability. France introduced a 
working paper during the negotiations that would have extended the Court’s 
jurisdiction to include juridical persons, but limited its definition of the term to ‘a 
corporation whose concrete, real or dominant objective is seeking private profit or 
benefit’.25 Under this proposal, any possibility to hold a non-corporate organisation 
accountable for its actions was extinguished. Despite containing a rather limited form 
of liability, the proposal was ultimately rejected and the final statute only included 
individual liability provisions.26  
 Two viewpoints have emerged as to why organisational liability was not 
included in the Rome Statute. The first suggests that the differences between the 
delegations were too great for agreement to be reached. Kai Ambos goes so far as to 
state that corporate liability was ‘rejected’ for reasons that he finds ‘quite 
convincing.’27 William Schabas is more measured in his analysis, however he does 
indicate that the complementarity concerns surrounding corporate criminal liability 
acted as ‘an insurmountable obstacle to consensus’.28 The second perspective focuses 
more on the idea that the inability to reach agreement was the result of too little time 
rather than an intractable difference of opinion. Per Saland recognized that the issue 
of the criminal responsibility of legal entities ‘deeply divided the delegations’ but also 
remarked that a ‘relatively broad majority’ came to accept its inclusion in the 
																																																																																																																																																														
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court (Reports and Other Documents) Vol III (United Nations 1998) 31. 
25 Working Group on General Matters of Criminal Law, Working Paper on Article 23, 
paragraphs 5 and 6, Doc. No. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.5/REV.2 (3 July 1998), 
Official Records of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Reports and other documents) 
vol 3(1998) 252. 
26 William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute (2nd ed, OUP 2016) 566. 
27 Kai Ambos, ‘Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in Otto Triffterer and 
Kai Ambos (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary (CH Beck 2015) 986; Kai Ambos, ‘General Principles of Criminal Law 
in the Rome Statute’ (1999) 10 Criminal Law Forum 1, 7. 
28 Schabas ICC Commentary (n 26) 564. 
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Statute.29 Despite this growing consensus, it was felt that there was not enough time 
to address the substantive and procedural issues that inclusion would entail, and as a 
result, organisational liability was not included in the final statute.30   
 
The Case for Organisational Criminal Liability 
 
 In the end, it is of no real consequence whether organisational liability was 
omitted from the statute due to lack of consensus or lack of time; we are left with a 
Rome Statute that only allows for individual liability. However, the exclusion of 
liability for legal entities does not mean that organisations are irrelevant in 
international criminal law. In fact, every international criminal trial has involved 
multiple perpetrators acting on behalf of an organisation, usually the state.31 The 
important role organisations play in international criminal law is also reflected in the 
acts criminalized in the Rome Statute. Individual guilt for all four of the crimes 
contained in the Rome Statute entails some element of organisational activity.32 
Additionally, with the exception of the crime of aggression, in which the group 
activity involved is necessarily that of the state, it is possible that the indispensible 
group involvement in the crimes tried at the International Criminal Court can be 
performed by non-state entities.33   
 Liability for crimes against humanity, as expressed in Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute, requires the accused to have committed one or more of a number of different 
acts, and those acts must be performed ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
																																																								
29 Per Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’, in Roy S Lee (ed), The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 199. 
30 Andrew Clapham, ‘The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law 
Over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal 
Court’, in M.T. Kamminga and S. Zia-Zarifi (eds), Multinational Corporations Under 
International Law (Kluwer Law International 2000) 157; William A Schabas, An 
Introduction to the International Criminal Court (CUP 2017) 211. 
31 Jens David Ohlin, ‘Organizational Criminality’, in Elies van Sliedregt and Sergey 
Vasiliev, Pluralism in International Criminal Law (OUP 2014) 116; Schabas State 
Policy (n 14) 954. 
32 George Fletcher, ‘The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The 
Problem of Collective Guilt’ (2002) 111 The Yale Law Journal 1499, 1514. 
33 Rome Statute (n 12) art 8 bis(1). 
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directed against a civilian population’.34  The Statute goes on to clarify that a 
fundamental component of an ‘[a]ttack directed against a civilian population’ is that it 
occurs ‘pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such attack’.35 The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes reiterates this 
requirement and elaborates on it to the extent that a deliberate failure to act might also 
constitute a State or organisational policy.36 This requirement is also reflected as a 
distinct element of each potential type of crime against humanity described in the 
Elements of Crimes.37 This is particularly relevant in the context of the crimes 
committed by United Nations’ peacekeepers in the Central African Republic. There, it 
is alleged, that the United Nations deliberately failed to act to prevent future crimes 
and to discipline the perpetrators of sexual violence against children.38 
 Whether the inclusion of organisational policies in Article 7 extends to non-
state organisations is a matter of some debate. The use of the disjunctive word ‘or’ 
between state and organisational in Article 7 suggests that the policies of non-state 
actors can serve as the basis for crimes against humanity. However, Cherif Bassiouni 
argues that ‘the words “organisational policy” do not refer to the policy of any 
organisation, but are limited state policies.’39 Professor Bassiouni bases this opinion 
on the language of Article 7(2), which he feels refers exclusively to state policy.40 
Professor Schabas agrees that the term should not apply to non-state actors but does 
expand it to encompass ‘State-like actors’ and groups within the state governmental 
structure that do not necessarily represent the entire state.41 Jens David Ohlin seems 
less interested in imposing such limitations on the nature of the organisation and 
																																																								
34 Rome Statute (n 12) art 7(1). 
35 Ibid at art 7(2)(a). 
36 International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes (2011) 5. 
37 Ibid at 5-12. 
38 Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Report of an 
Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping 
Forces in the Central African Republic’ (17 December 2015) at 33 <www.un.org/ 
News/dh/infocus/centafricrepub/Independent-Review-Report.pdf> (accessed 10 July 
2018). 
39 M Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: 
Introduction, Analysis and Integrated Text, vol 1 (Transnational Publishers 2005) 
152. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Schabas State Policy (n 14) 973. 
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instead emphasises the indispensability of the collective when proving crimes against 
humanity.42  
 A similar organisational requirement is also found in Article 8, the statutory 
provision on war crimes. The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over war 
crimes ‘in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-
scale commission of such crimes.’43 This formulation is more equivocal than that 
found in Article 7 about crimes against humanity and allows for the possibility that a 
single war crime can be committed without it necessarily being part of an 
organisational plan or policy. However, as the Elements of Crimes makes clear, all 
war crimes must take place within the context of an international or non-international 
armed conflict.44 The term ‘armed conflict’ is not defined in either the Rome Statute 
or the Elements of Crimes. Therefore, in the International Criminal Court’s first 
judgment in the Lubanga case, Trial Chamber I adopted the definition set out by the 
Appeals Chamber of the ad hoc Tribunals in Tadić.45 According to Tadić, an armed 
conflict exists ‘whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State.’ This definition demonstrates that the involvement of a 
group or organisation is necessary for an armed conflict to exist, which in turn is a 
fundamental element of all war crimes. Also, while the necessary group activity will 
often be attributable to the State, the definition does not require the involvement of 
the State. Therefore, without the involvement of a group there could be no war 
crimes.   
 While war crimes can only take place in the context of an armed conflict, 
which is by its very definition an activity that requires group involvement, Article 8 
does allow for the possibility that a single act performed by an individual could 
constitute a war crime. Unlike crimes against humanity, which must take place 
‘pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy’, war crimes are 
‘committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such 
																																																								
42 Ohlin (n 31) 118-19. 
43 Rome Statute (n 12) art 8(1). 
44 ICC Elements of Crimes (n 36) 13-42. 
45 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-
01/06, T Ch (14 March 2012) § 533; citing Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1-AR72, A Ch (2 
October 1995) § 70. 
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crimes.’46 This different formulation of war crimes does not demand that the plan or 
policy be attributable to the State or another organisation. Instead, it leaves open the 
possibility that a plan or policy developed by an individual could suffice to meet this 
requirement. However, it could be challenging to prove that such a plan or policy was 
sufficiently associated to the armed conflict, or that it met the gravity threshold, to 
constitute a war crime. Further, while the ‘large-scale commission’ of war crimes 
does not explicitly require the involvement of a group, it is difficult to envision a 
sufficiently ‘large-scale commission’ of crimes necessary to rise to the level of war 
crimes that does not involve some component of organisational involvement. 
Therefore, while it is theoretically possible for war crimes to occur without the 
participation of an organisation, it is unlikely that such will be so in practice. 
 The crime of genocide differs from the other three crimes in the Rome Statute 
because it does not explicitly mention group involvement in the definition of the 
crime. Instead, the group is only referenced to the extent that the criminal acts must be 
directed at a ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious group’.47 This supports the idea that 
genocide could, theoretically, be committed by a lone genocidiare not acting in 
accordance with a larger organisational plan or policy. However, the addition of a 
contextual element to each form of genocide in the Elements of Crimes subverts that 
notion. The final element of each type of genocide states ‘[t]he conduct took place in 
the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was 
conduct that could itself effect such destruction.’ 48  Some commentators have 
interpreted this element as requiring the existence of an organisational plan or policy 
for the crime of genocide to be committed.49 This view does not accord with the case 
law of the ad hoc tribunals, which have consistently held that an organisational policy 
or plan to commit genocide is not a necessary element of genocide but that the 
existence of such a policy or plan can act as an important indicator of the accused 
individual’s intent.50 However, the position taken by the ad hoc tribunals has been 
																																																								
46 Rome Statute (n 12) arts 7(1) and 8(1). 
47 Rome Statute (n 12) art 6(1). 
48 ICC Elements of Crimes (n 36) 2-4. 
49 Ohlin (n 31) 121. 
50 Gerhard Werle and Florian Jeßberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (3d 
ed, OUP 2014) 309; citing Prosecutor v Jelisić (Judgement) IT-95-10-A, A Ch (5 July 
2001) § 48; Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgement) IT-98-33-A, A Ch (19 April 2004) §§ 
223 et seq; Semanza v Prosecutor (Judgement) ICTR-97-20-A, A Ch (20 May 2005) 
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criticised as ‘superficial’ and a ‘results-oriented political decision’.51 Further, even if 
an organisational plan or policy is not a necessary element of genocide, the ‘massive 
and systematic nature’ of the crime ‘presupposes collective organization.’52 
 Organisational involvement in international criminal law is not limited to the 
direct role organisations play in the commission of the crimes contained in the Rome 
Statute. Organisations are also indirectly involved in individual criminal liability in a 
number of different ways. In many cases, organisations provide individuals with the 
ability to commit international crimes. The institutional context of the organisation 
will often provide the individual with ‘the motive, opportunity and means’ to commit 
criminal acts.53 Additionally, feeling connected to a larger organisation can also 
diminish an individual’s sense of moral responsibility and increase their sense of 
security.54 
 The significant role organisations necessarily play in international crimes begs 
the question: Why is liability for international crimes exclusively reserved for 
individuals?  This question is particularly relevant when taking into account one of 
the oft-repeated purposes of the International Criminal Court, ‘to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators’ of atrocity crimes so as ‘to contribute to the prevention 
of such crimes’.55   The failure to prosecute organisations for their role in committing 
atrocity crimes represents a gap in criminal liability and does not fulfil the 
International Criminal Court’s promise ‘to put an end to impunity’. 56 Limiting 
criminal liability to individuals leaves organisations relatively free to participate in the 
commission of atrocity crimes without fear of punishment.  
																																																																																																																																																														
§ 260; Simba v Prosecutor (Judgement) ICTR-01-76-A, A Ch (27 November 2007) § 
260. 
51 Schabas State Policy (n 14) 959. 
52 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and 
International Responsibility of the State’, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John 
RWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary (OUP 2002) 1090. 
53 Maurice Punch, ‘Why Corporations Kill and Get Away With It: The Failure of the 
Law to Cope With Crime in Organizations’, in André NollKaemper and Harmen van 
der Wilt (eds), System Criminality in International Law (CUP 2009) 56. 
54 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, vol 8 (1947) 354. 
55 Rome Statute (n 12) preamble. 
56 Nadia Bernaz, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability Under International Law: The New TV 
S.A.L. and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. Cases at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2015) 13 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 313, 319.  
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 Ineffective national laws designed to impose criminal liability on 
organisations and/or their individual employees or members have driven efforts to 
provide for organisational criminal liability in international law.57 Many individual 
states are often unwilling or unable to adequately regulate human rights abuses 
committed by organisations within their jurisdiction.58 This is particularly true of 
corporations where the imposition of liability is inhibited by: a lack of financial or 
legal resources to properly investigate and prosecute alleged crimes; a lack of 
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute crimes allegedly committed by multinational 
corporations in more than one country; the fear that corporations will relocate their 
operations, or redirect foreign direct investment, away from countries attempting to 
investigate or prosecute; the participation of government officials in the crimes 
alleged against the corporation; or a preference for financial investment over the 
enforcement of human rights norms.59  
 Creating international jurisdiction over crimes committed by organisations, 
and permitting the International Criminal Court to serve as an appropriate venue, has 
the potential to close this impunity gap by promoting the deterrent function of 
criminal law. Knowing that their actions will have criminal consequences could 
specifically deter organisations from participating in atrocity crimes.60  Specific 
deterrence is believed to prevent atrocity crimes through the public stigma and 
reputational injury that accompanies any suggestion of an individual or group’s 
																																																								
57 Larissa van der Herik and Jernej Letnar Černič, ‘Regulating Corporations Under 
International Law: From Human Rights to International Criminal Law and Back 
Again’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 725, 741. 
58 Kathryn Haigh, ‘Extending the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction to 
Corporations: Overcoming Complementarity Concerns’ (2008) 14(1) Australian 
Journal of Human Rights 199, 200; Joanna Kyriakakis, ‘Corporations and the 
International Criminal Court: The Complementarity Objection Laid Bare’ (2008) 
19(1) Criminal Law Forum 115, 146-47. 
59 Van den Herik and Černič (n 57) 741; see also Mordechai Kremnitzer, ‘A Possible 
Case for Imposing Corporate Liability on Corporations in International Criminal 
Law’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 909, 916-17; Haigh (n 58) 
200; Kyriakakis Complementarity Issues Laid Bare (n 58) 146-47. 
60 Joanna Kyriakakis, ‘Corporations Before International Criminal Courts: 
Implications for the International Criminal Justice Project’ (2017) 30(1) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 221, 236; Clapham (n 30) 147. 
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involvement in such crimes. 61  Corporations are especially predisposed towards 
specific deterrence because they are meant to function as rational actors whose 
decisions are not emotionally or socially motivated. 62  However, although the 
decisions of corporations are meant to be rational and driven by a cost-benefit 
analysis, it is entirely possible that the rational decision will be to commit human 
rights abuses as doing so will be in the best interests of the corporation. That is, the 
corporation may decide to continue to participate in atrocity crimes if it believes that 
the benefit of their criminal activity outweighs any potential detriment caused by 
public stigma and reputational injury. Support for this can be found in the form of 
Chiquita’s actions in Colombia as evidenced by its decision to continue to pay 
protection money to the AUC even after learning that the AUC was a violent 
paramilitary group and after being advised that it was illegal to continue to make the 
payments.63  
 Prosecuting organisations for human rights abuses could also act as a general 
deterrent. General deterrence is the theory that punishing the perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes will ‘dissuade for ever, others who may be tempted in the future to perpetrate 
such atrocities by showing them that the international community shall not tolerate 
the serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.’ 64 
Punishing organisational perpetrators of atrocity crimes is achieved in two steps: first, 
it transforms popular perceptions of acceptable organisational behaviour; and second, 
it promotes the gradual internalisation of those values leading to ‘habitual conformity’ 
with the law.65 Much as with specific deterrence, it is thought that the stigmatisation 
resulting from criminal prosecutions for atrocity crimes, and the resulting financial 
losses potentially arising out of that stigma, will force organisations to comply with 
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the law so as not to negatively effect their operations.66 Deterring organisations in this 
way will have the effect of improving the global human rights situation.    
 The application of organisational criminal liability has not gained universal 
acceptance despite the demonstrable benefits it could have on protecting human 
rights. There are two main issues preventing greater acceptance of this concept: 1) a 
concern that the complementarity principle contained in the Rome Statute prevents 
the imposition of organisational liability; and 2) the fear that any form of group 
liability will have the tendency to minimise individual liability. Many commentators 
see the complementarity principle as a significant obstacle to imposing organisational 
criminal liability at the International Criminal Court.67 The Preamble and Article 1 of 
the Rome Statute introduce the complementarity principle by emphasizing that the 
Court’s jurisdiction will be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.68 The 
principle is made operative through Article 17. It makes clear that the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court is meant to complement domestic criminal 
jurisdiction, and that cases will be inadmissible before the International Criminal 
Court unless the State in which a domestic trial could take place is ‘unwilling or 
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.’69 The purpose of the 
principle is to ensure that the International Criminal Court is one of secondary 
jurisdiction that will only prosecute when confronted with an impunity gap caused by 
a State’s unwillingness or inability to prosecute. 70 Making the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court subordinate to domestic jurisdiction prevents it from 
intruding on a State’s proper exercise of its domestic criminal jurisdiction.71  
 Group criminal activity raises complementarity concerns because there is no 
uniformity in national jurisdictions about whether organisations can be exposed to 
criminal liability or how such liability should apply. States that do not impose this 
form of criminal liability are apprehensive that an interpretation of Article 17 that 
allows for prosecutions under these circumstances could represent an infringement on 
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their sovereignty by effectively imposing criminal liability even when national laws 
do not.72 It is their belief that to impose liability under these circumstances violates 
the principle of complementarity because it extends criminal liability into areas in 
which it does not already exist in national law. This differs from the traditional 
formulation of complementarity where the International Criminal Court will only 
pursue a prosecution when the relevant domestic legal system ‘is unwilling or unable’ 
to exercise its jurisdiction and the suspected behaviour is criminalised both 
domestically and internationally.     
 In response, some commentators have argued that the failure to criminalise 
organisational criminal activity renders those States unable to prosecute within the 
meaning of Article 17.73 Inability to prosecute is defined in Article 17(3) of the Rome 
Statute as a situation where, ‘due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of 
its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary 
evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.’74 Antonio 
Cassese extends this definition and argues that inability also encompasses situations 
in which a national legal system is unable to prosecute an accused, ‘not because of a 
collapse or malfunctioning of the judicial system, but on account of legislative 
impediments’.75 Joanna Kyriakakis builds on Cassese’s position by asserting that a 
legislative impediment results when there are no laws endowing courts with legal 
competence organisations.76 This impediment effectively renders domestic courts 
unavailable to prosecute, in turn producing an inability to prosecute. 77  These 
arguments lead to the conclusion that States that do not impose criminal liability on 
corporations are unable to prosecute within the meaning of the Rome Statute thus 
allowing for prosecutions at the International Criminal Court. 
 Another way to look at complementarity in this context may be to focus on the 
plain language of the Statute. Article 17(1)(a) states, ‘a case is inadmissible where: (a) 
[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, 
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
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prosecution’.78 The important phrase to focus on in this context is ‘a State which has 
jurisdiction over it’. It could be argued that when a State does not criminalise the 
behaviour of an organisation in its national law, and an organisation commits a 
potentially criminal act within the territory of that State, there is no State with 
jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction requires the existence of two different 
components, jurisdiction ratione materiae and jurisdiction ratione personae, i.e. the 
must be able to exercise jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties to a 
dispute. When a State does not criminalise organisational behaviour it does not have 
both forms of jurisdiction over the matter and therefore cannot be described as ‘a 
State with jurisdiction’. If there is no State with jurisdiction within the meaning of the 
Statute then Article 17(1)(a) cannot act to render a case inadmissible at the 
International Criminal Court. This means that there is no real complementarity issue 
and that the Court could exercise its jurisdiction over groups located in States that do 
not criminalise organisational activity if it were to expand its own jurisdiction to 
encompass corporations.  
 Supporters of imposing organisational criminal liability at the International 
Criminal Court have tried to find other ways to avoid the complementarity concerns 
of those States that do not permit organisational criminal liability. One suggestion 
relating specifically to corporations has been to create an exception under which 
corporations that are incorporated in States that do not criminalise corporate 
behaviour will be excluded from liability at the International Criminal Court.79 This 
proposal is fatally flawed.  An exception that acts to shield corporations from liability 
based on its location or place of incorporation would only encourage corporations to 
relocate to those States that do not impose organisational criminal liability. In turn, 
nations that currently hold corporations criminally liable for their actions would be 
disinclined from doing so in an effort to prevent corporations from moving their bases 
of operations. It could also lead States Parties to the Rome Statute that hold 
corporations accountable for their criminal actions to leave, or threaten to leave, the 
International Criminal Court, much as some African Nations have done over the issue 
of head of state immunity. Ultimately, an exception like the one described above 
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would have the tendency to diminish, rather than increase, the enforcement of 
criminal liability against corporations. 
 A second worry about implementing organisational criminal liability is the 
effect it could have on individual liability. International criminal law has been focused 
on determining individual criminal liability since the Nuremberg trials. The decision 
to focus on individual culpability over organisational responsibility was made to 
ensure that individual actors were being held responsible for the crimes they 
committed and not for the crimes of others.80 However, the goals of ending criminal 
activity and preventing its reoccurrence cannot be achieved through the imposition of 
individual criminal liability alone. 81  Sanctioning both the organisation and the 
individuals who control the organisation is the only way to successfully ensure that 
there is no accountability gap when addressing human rights violations.82 Directly 
prosecuting and punishing the organisation will motivate it to improve its monitoring 
of its own actions and should promote different future behaviour leading to a change 
in corporate culture.83 Holding organisations accountable will also guarantee that 
responsibility for atrocity crimes will be properly assigned, particularly when it is 
impossible to determine individual responsibility. Instances of this can include: when 
the culpable individual cannot be identified or located; when the corporate structure is 
too complicated to accurately identify culpable individuals; or when the corporation’s 
actions cumulatively constitute a crime but the actions of any one individual do not.84 
Organisational criminal liability minimizes these problems and generates greater 
overall accountability. It also reduces the danger of trials being viewed as producing a 
form of partial justice, or from being derided as scapegoating, because it guarantees 
that all responsible parties are held accountable for their actions.85 This is a particular 
danger when the individual stands accused of a collective crime ‘committed by and in 
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the name of’ a group of which they are an employee or member.86 
 Incorporating organisational criminal liability into international criminal law 
does not mean that individuals should no longer be held responsible for atrocity 
crimes when those crimes can also be attributed to an organisation. Even if 
organisational liability is recognised it does not change the facts that individual 
accountability remains the focus of international criminal law or that the goal of 
international criminal trials is to properly apportion blame to all culpable parties.87 
Further, organisational liability without individual liability would lead to impunity on 
the part of the individual by encouraging individual decision-makers to enact 
organisational practices that will further his or her own interests without concern for 
the effect of those actions on the organisation.88 Organisational criminal liability is 
not meant to upset the existing legal order. It is intended to augment individual 
criminal responsibility and create an all-inclusive approach so as to close the existing 
impunity gap and strengthen human rights protections.  
 Linking organisational liability to individual liability is not a new idea. In fact, 
it was suggested in a working paper on criminal responsibility presented during the 
Rome Conference by the Working Group on General Principles of Criminal Law. The 
proposal directly tied the criminal liability of juridical persons to that of natural 
persons by mandating that an individual must be charged if a juridical person was also 
to be charged.89 Importantly, charges could only be brought against a juridical person 
when the natural person had been convicted of the crimes charged.90 This approach to 
organisational liability would guarantee that both responsible parties would be held 
accountable for their actions, thus closing the impunity gap in human rights 
protections. Ultimately, this proposal was not adopted. Per Saland, the chair of the 
Working Group noted that ‘all delegations had recognized the great merits of the 
relevant proposal, but some had felt that it would perhaps be premature to introduce 
that notion.’91 The delegates chose to conform to the status quo and adopt a Statute 
																																																								
86 Fletcher (n 32) 1514. 
87 Elies van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (OUP 
2012) 6; Simpson (n 80) 87. 
88 Kaeb (n 82) 383. 
89 Working Paper on Article 23, paragraphs 5 and 6 (n 25) 252. 
90 Ibid. 
91 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, Summary Record of the Meeting of the Committee 
	
	 19 




 The proposal to allow both individual and organisational criminal liability 
may have been seen as premature during the Rome Conference but it is an idea whose 
time has come. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights secures for every person 
the rights to ‘life, liberty and security of person.’92  To that end, they are entitled to an 
effective remedy for violations of those rights and the protection of the rule of law.93 
However, a remedy can only be effective if the parties responsible for violations can 
be held accountable. Apportioning responsibility to parties for their actions that 
violate another’s human rights through the imposition of criminal sanction is what 
links international criminal law with international human rights law.94 It is this 
connection that allows for the enforcement of human rights norms and encourages the 
greater enhancement of human rights protections. 95  To achieve this goal it is 
necessary to hold to account all parties involved in the perpetration of human rights 
abuses and atrocity crimes, regardless of whether they are an individual or a 
collective. The AUC affiliated paramilitary groups in Colombia may not have been 
able to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes without the financial support 
of Chiquita. The sexual abuse of children by United Nations’ peacekeepers in the 
Central African may have been prevented if a culture of impunity has not been 
allowed to flourish. Chiquita and the United Nations should not be able to escape 
responsibility simply by virtue of their existence as entities rather than individuals. If 
the promises of the Universal Declaration are to mean anything then criminal liability 
must be understood to encompass all possible culprits, including organisations, to 
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